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Abstract
In this paper we contribute to the study of how democracy works when
politicians are better informed than the electorate about conditions relevant
for policy choice. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic
model of electoral competition. An important feature of the model is that
candidate quality is state-dependent. Our main insight is that if the elec-
torate is su¢ ciently well informed then there exists an equilibrium where the
candidatespolicy positions reveal their information and the policy outcome
is the same as it would be if voters were fully informed (the median policy
in the true state of the world).
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1 Introduction
It is a reasonable assumption that politicians are generally better informed than
the electorate about conditions relevant for policy choice. They usually have sta¤
to help them receive and process information and sometimes have access to in-
formation that is not public, for example information related to national security.
Furthermore they have much stronger incentives than voters to be well informed
because their carreers depend on how they do as policy makers. In this paper
we contribute to the study of how democracy works when politicians are better
informed than voters. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic
model of electoral competition.
We consider an election with two candidates and one issue. The candidates
are purely o¢ ce-motivated, i.e. their only objective is to maximize the probability
of winning. Before the election the candidates announce credible policy positions.
There are two states of the world. Both candidates are informed about the true
state when they announce their positions. Voters are only partially informed about
the state, they receive a signal that is correlated with the true state. This signal
is private information, i.e. it is unknown to the candidates when they announce
positions. Each voter has a single peaked policy utility function in each state and
the preferred policy is di¤erent in the two states.
The voters do not only care about policy, they also care about candidate quality.
One candidate has a quality advantage in one state and the other candidate has
a quality advantage in the other state. Furthermore there is a stochastic element
in voter evaluation of candidates. Suppose for example that the two candidates
have announced the same position and that the voters have inferred the true state.
Then the candidate with a quality advantage wins with a probability that is greater
than one half (because of the quality advantage) but smaller than one (because of
the stochastic element of voter evaluation).
A revealing equilibrium is one where at least one of the candidates announces
di¤erent policies in the two states. Thus voters can infer the true state. Our rst
main result is that in any such equilibrium (satisfying a known renement condi-
tion) the candidates converge to the median position of the true state. Our second
main result is that a revealing equilibrium exists when the electorate is su¢ ciently
well informed about the state of the world. So when voters are su¢ ciently well
informed then it is at least a possibility (there could exist non-revealing equilibria)
that electoral competition works as if the voters were fully informed.
Our rst result on non-revealing equilibria show that many of these exist. Fur-
thermore, we see that no matter how well informed the electorate is there always
exists a non-revealing equilibrium, even with a symmetry restriction. None of these
equilibria can be eliminated by the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987))
which is the most commonly used renement condition in signalling games. In-
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stead we show that a monotonicity condition on votersbeliefs does eliminate many
of the non-revealing equilibria. With that condition a non-revealing equilibrium
only exists if the voters are not too well informed. We also see that the candidates
diverge by at least the distance between the medians in the two states.
Before we move on we will present a stylized example of a real world situation
where our model applies. Suppose a retired general is running against a succesful
governor for the US presidency. Both of them primarily care about getting elected,
policy preferences are secondary. The main issue is how much of a xed tax
revenue to spend on national security related public goods (e.g. military services,
anti-terrorism, a missile defense system). The rest of the budget is spend on
other public goods (e.g. health care, education, infrastructure). The candidates
know more about the security threat to the country than the voters because they
get national security briengs while voters only get information from the media.
When the threat is high then each voter wants to spend more on security related
public goods than when it is low. Thus the median preferred level of national
secuity spending is higher when the threat is high. Furthermore, when the security
threat is high then the general has a quality advantage (national security issues
are more important) and when the threat is low then the governor has a quality
advantage (domestic issues are more important). The possibility of unforeseen
events, scandals, campaign mistakes etc. makes voting stochastic.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review related literature.
Then, in Section 3 and 4, we set up the model and dene our notion of equilib-
rium. Section 5 and 6 contain our results on revealing and non-revealing equilibria.
Finally we discuss and conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
The two most immediately related papers are Schultz (1996) and Martinelli (2001).
They ask the same general question as we do but they both assume that candi-
dates are policy-motivated. This is fundamentally di¤erent from our assumption
about completely o¢ ce-motivated candidates. In Schultz (1996) candidates are
fully informed about the state of the economy while voters are uninformed. Thus
voters only receive information from the candidatescredible positions. There is
revelation in (rened) equilibrium if at least one of the candidates have policy
preferences that are su¢ ciently similar to the preferences of the median voter. In
any revealing equilibrium there is convergence to the median policy of the true
state of the world.
Martinelli (2001) considers a model where both candidates and voters receive
private information about the state of the world but candidates are better informed
than voters. The main result is that a revealing equilibrium always exists. This
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depends crucially on the assumption that voters have private information. The
candidates do not converge in revealing equilibria.
Several other papers study models in which politicians are better informed than
the electorate. In both Alesina and Cukierman (1990) and Harrington (1993) pol-
icy is decided after the election and voters are uncertain about the candidates
policy preferences. Therefore earlier policy decisions by the incumbent reveal in-
formation to the voters about what he will do if reelected. That induces the
incumbent (who wants to be reelected) to distort his policy choice. In Alesina and
Cukierman he does so by choosing a noisy policy instrument, in Harrington it is
done by choosing a policy that is more likely to be well received.
Roemer (1994) considers a model where two policy motivated candidates (par-
ties) are better informed about how the economy works than the electorate. Can-
didates announce both policies and theories of the economy, voters update their
beliefs based only on announced theories. In equilibrium there is convergence to
the median with respect to policy but divergence with respect to theory.
In Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) the incumbent is better informed than vot-
ers about how di¤erent policies map into outcomes. Voters update beliefs based on
the incumbents (credible) policy announcement and votes for reelection if his an-
nouncement is preferred to the expected policy of the challenger. The main insight
is that relatively extreme right wing policies are more likely to be implemented by
a left wing incumbent (and vice versa) because of credibility issues.
Our model is also related to the literature on candidate quality/valence advan-
tage. Recent contributions to this literature are Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2005). These papers all ana-
lyze models of electoral competition where candidates di¤er in quality such that
if they announce su¢ ciently similar policy positions then each voter votes for the
candidate of highest quality. There is no uncertainty about who the high quality
candidate is. This is fundamentally di¤erent from our paper where no candidate
has an a priori quality advantage because quality is state-dependent. We are not
aware of other models with uncertainty about candidate quality.
3 The Model
We consider a one issue election. The policy space X is some closed interval
(bounded or unbounded) on the real axis. There are two purely o¢ ce-motivated
candidates, i.e. their only objective is to maximize the probability of winning.
The electorate consists of a continuum of voters (indexed by i). The voters
have utility functions over the policy space. The utility functions depend on the
state of the world ! which can be either L or H. The utility function of voter i is
ui(xj!) =  jx  xi (!)j; x 2 X;! 2 fL;Hg;
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where xi (!) is the preferred policy of voter i in state !. The preferred policies of
the voters in each state are distributed according to some distribution functions
FL; FH . In each state there are unique median positions, i.e. unique xmL ; x

mH
2 X
such that
FL(x

mL
) = FH(x

mH
) =
1
2
:
We assume that the median is further to the right in state H than in state L, i.e.
xmL < x

mH
:
Furthermore, we assume that the ordering of voters by preferred positions is the
same in the two states. Formally, for all voters i; j,
xi (L)  xj(L) () xi (H)  xj(H)
This implies that, for all voters i,
xi (L) = x

mL
() xi (H) = xmH
Thus a voter with preferred policy equal to the median in one state also has
preferred policy equal to the median in the other state. So (with only a slight
abuse of language) it makes sense to speak about the median voter.
The candidates are fully informed about the state of the world. The voters
only receive a signal
!V 2 fl; hg:
All voters receive the same signal and the signal is unknown to the candidates
when they announce positions. The signal is distributed according to
Pr(ljL) = Pr(hjH) = ;
Pr(ljH) = Pr(hjL) = 1  ;
where  2 (1
2
; 1) is a parameter. Each voter has the prior Pr(L) = Pr(H) = 1
2
. So
if voters update based on their signal then their belief is given by
Pr(Ljl) = Pr(Hjh) = ;
Pr(Hjl) = Pr(Ljh) = 1  :
Candidate quality is state-dependent. One candidate ("Candidate L") has a
quality advantage in the L state while the other candidate ("Candidate H") has
a quality advantage in the H state. Furthermore there is a symmetric stochastic
element to each voters candidate preference. These two features are modelled
the following way. Suppose Candidate L has announced the policy xL and that
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Candidate H has announced xH . Then voter is utility of voting for Candidate L
is
ULi (x
Lj!) = ui(xLj!) +  L(!) + ;
where, for some parameter  > 0,
 L(!) =

 if ! = L
0 if ! = H

and, for some parameter  > 0,  is drawn from a uniform distribution on the
interval [  1
2
; 1
2
]. Note that the realized value of  is the same for all voters.
Voter is utility of voting for Candidate H is
UHi (x
H j!) = ui(xH j!) +  H(!):
where
 H(!) =

0 if ! = L
 if ! = H

:
Each voter votes for the candidate giving him the highest expected utility based
on his belief about the state of the world. So if voter i believes that the probability
of state L is L then he votes for Candidate L if
L(ui(x
LjL)++)+(1 L)(ui(xLjH)+) > Lui(xH jL)+(1 L)(ui(xH jH)+):
This is equivalent to
 > L(ui(x
H jL)  ui(xLjL)  ) + (1  L)(ui(xH jH)  ui(xLjH) + ):
If we plug in the policy utility function of the voter then this inequality becomes
 > L(jxL xi (L)j jxH xi (L)j )+(1 L)((jxL xi (H)j jxH xi (H)j+):
The timeline of the election game is as follows:
1. The candidates observe the state of the world and then simultaneously an-
nounce policy positions.
2. The voters observe the candidatespositions and receive a signal about the
state of the world. The value of  is realized. The voters cast their votes.
3. The winning candidate enacts his announced position (positions are credi-
ble).
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4 Equilibrium
A strategy prole for the candidates consists of a policy announcement in each
state of the world for each candidate and can therefore be written
(xL(L); xL(H)); (xH(L); xH(H)):
The belief functions of the voters depend on the two candidatesannouncements
and the voterssignal. We make the assumption that all voters have the same belief
function. The votersbelief about the probability of state L is written
L(x
L; xH ; !V ):
Each candidates objective is to maximize the probability of winning in each
state given the other candidates strategy, the belief function of the voters, the
distribution of the voterssignal and the distribution of . The following lemma
shows that the median voter decides the election.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that, given the candidatesannouncements, the voterssig-
nal, and the realization of , the median voter strictly prefers Candidate L (H).
Then a strict majority of voters prefers Candidate L (H).
Proof. Suppose the median voter strictly prefers Candidate L, i.e.
 > L(jxL   xmL j   jxH   xmL j   ) + (1  L)((jxL   xmH j   jxH   xmH j+ ):
We then have to show that for each voter i in a strict majority,
 > L(jxL xi (L)j jxH xi (L)j )+(1 L)((jxL xi (H)j jxH xi (H)j+):
Suppose xL  xH (the other case is analogous). It then su¢ ces to show that
the inequality above holds for all voters i with xi (L)  xmL (that is only a weak
majority but a simple continuity argument shows that the inequality also holds
for voters with a preferred point slightly to the right of the median).
Pick a voter i with xi (L)  xmL . The inequality is satised if
jxL   xi (L)j   jxH   xi (L)j  jxL   xmL j   jxH   xmL j
and
jxL   xi (H)j   jxH   xi (H)j  jxL   xmH j   jxH   xmH j.
These inequalities are straightforward to verify.
The proof of the statement when the median voter strictly prefers Candidate
H is analogous.2
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By the lemma we see that if (xH(L); xH(H)) is the strategy of Candidate H
then the problem of Candidate L in state ! is
max
x
Pr
;(!V j!)
[ > L(x; x
H(!); !V )((jx  xmL j   jxH(!)  xmL j   )+
(1  L(x; xH(!); !V ))(jx  xmH j   jxH(!)  xmH j+ )]:
And if (xL(L); xL(H)) is the strategy of Candidate L then the problem of Candi-
date H in state ! is
max
x
Pr
;(!V j!)
[ < L(x
L(!); x; !V )((jxL(!)  xmL j   jx  xmL j   )+
(1  L(xL(!); x; !V ))(jxL(!)  xmH j   jx  xmH j+ )]:
Then we are ready to dene our notion of equilibrium. It is that of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium with the extra condition that all voters have the same belief
function.
Denition 4.2 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of candidate strategies
(x^L(L); x^L(H)); (x^H(L); x^H(H));
and a voter belief function about the probability of state L
^L(x
L; xH ; !V )
such that
1. In each state each candidates announcement maximizes his probability of
winning given the other candidates announcement, the belief function of the
voter, the distribution of the voters signal and the distribution of ;
2. The belief function is consistent with Bayes rule on the equilibrium path.
I.e. if x^L(L) 6= x^L(H) or x^H(L) 6= x^H(H) then
^L(x^
L(L); x^H(L); l) = ^L(x^
L(L); x^H(L); h) = 1,
^L(x^
L(H); x^H(H); l) = ^L(x^
L(H); x^H(H); h) = 0:
And if x^L(L) = x^L(H) and x^H(L) = x^H(H) then
^L(x^
L(L); x^H(L); !V ) = ^L(x^
L(H); x^H(H); !V ) =

 if !V = l
1   if !V = h

:
An equilibrium where the announcements of the candidates reveal the state to
the voters, i.e. at least one of the candidates announces di¤erent positions in the
two states, is called a revealing equilibrium. An equilibrium where each candidate
announces the same position in both states is called a non-revealing equilibrium.
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5 Revealing Equilibria
We will rst introduce a renement condition that puts restrictions on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in revealing equilibria. It has been used by Schultz (1996) in
a similar setting. The content of the condition is that if one candidates strategy
reveals the state (i.e. he takes di¤erent positions in the two states) and the other
candidate deviates to an out-of-equilibrium position then the voters believe the
non-deviating candidate.
Denition 5.1 (Renement Condition (R1)) Consider a revealing equilibrium
where the candidate strategies are (x^L(L); x^L(H)) and (x^H(L); x^H(H)) and the
voter belief function is ^L. It satises (R1) if the following two conditions are
satised.
1. Suppose x^L(L) 6= x^L(H). Then
^L(x^
L(L); x; l) = ^L(x^
L(L); x; h) = 1 and
^L(x^
L(H); x; l) = ^L(x^
L(H); x; h) = 0 for all x 6= x^H(L); x^H(H):
2. Suppose x^H(L) 6= x^H(H). Then
^L(x; x^
H(L); l) = ^L(x; x^
H(L); h) = 1 and
^L(x; x^
H(H); l) = ^L(x; x^
H(H); h) = 0 for all x 6= x^L(L); x^L(H):
Let D denote the distance between the median position in the two states, i.e.
D = xmH   xmL :
For all of our results in this and the following section we will assume that
 +D <
1
2
:
Suppose for example that each candidate announces the median of the state where
he has an advantage. Then the assumption implies that, no matter what the belief
of the voters is, both candidates have a positive probability of winning the election.
The assumption simplies our analysis considerably because it ensures that in all
situations we need to consider the realization of  matters.
Our rst result shows that in any revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) the
candidates converge to the median position of the true state.
Theorem 5.2 In any revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) the candidate strategies
are
(x^L(L); x^L(H)) = (x^H(L); x^H(H)) = (xmL ; x

mH
):
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Proof. Let (x^L(L); x^L(H)); (x^H(L); x^H(H)) be the candidate strategies in a
revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1). At least one of the candidates must an-
nounce di¤erent policies in the two states. Suppose that x^L(L) 6= x^L(H) (the case
x^H(L) 6= x^H(H) is analogous). If x^H(L) 6= xmL then Candidate H can win with a
higher probability in state L by deviating to a position x 6= x^H(H) that is closer
to xmL than x^
H(L) (by (R1) the voter will still be sure that the state is L). Thus
we must have x^H(L) = xmL . Similarly we get x^
H(H) = xmH . And then we can
use the same argument for Candidate L to get x^L(L) = xmL and x^
L(H) = xmH .2
Our next step is to nd the set of parameter values for which a revealing
equilibrium satisfying (R1) exists. The following result shows that there is a cut-
o¤ value of  such that a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) exists if and only if
the voter signal is at least as informative as this cut-o¤ value.
Theorem 5.3 There exists a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) if and only if
  R;
where
R =
1
2
+

2( +D)
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that R is increasing in  and
lim
!0
R =
1
2
:
Thus we see that if the di¤erence-in-quality parameter  increases then the elec-
torate has to be better informed in order to make the candidates reveal their
information. The intuition behind this observation is that the higher  is the more
costly (in terms of probability of winning) it is for the disadvantaged candidate to
reveal the state relative to not revealing the state. Therefore, when  increases the
new cut-o¤ value of  must make it more costly for the disadvantaged candidate
not to reveal, i.e. it must be higher. We also see that when the di¤erence in
candidate quality vanishes then there exists a revealing equilibrium no matter how
little information the electorate has.
Also note that R is decreasing in D: So when the median positions of the
two states are further apart then a revealing equilibrium exist for less informed
electorates. The reason is that a higher D makes it more costly not to reveal
relative to revealing for the disadvantaged candidate. The good news from this
observation is that when the state of the world really matters for policy choice (i.e.
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D is high) then it takes less voter information to make the candidates reveal the
true state by converging to the median.
We end this section with a remark on the equilibrium voter belief function used
in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Remark 5.4 In the proof of Theorem 5.3 the equilibrium belief function satises
^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) = 1 and ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; h) = 0:
So if the disadvantaged candidate deviates to the median of the false state then
voters overinfer from their signal. Suppose we require that voters should instead
be Bayesians in this case, i.e. that
^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) =  and ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; h) = 1  :
Then, by mimicking the proof of Theorem 5.3, we get that a revealing equilibrium
satisfying (R1) exists if and only if
  1
2
+
1
2
r

 +D
:
Compared to R the new cut-o¤ value is strictly larger but has qualitatively the
same dependence on  and D.
6 Non-Revealing Equilibria
We will only consider non-revealing equilibria that are symmetric in the following
sense.
Denition 6.1 (Symmetry) Consider a non-revealing equilibrium where Can-
didate L announces x^L and Candidate H announces x^H . It is symmetric if
jx^L   xmL j = jx^H   xmH j and jx^L   xmH j = jx^H   xmL j:
Note that the symmetry condition is equivalent to
x^L + x^H
2
=
xmL + x

mH
2
:
Also note that when x^L is specied, then so is x^H .
In the following result we nd all possible symmetric non-revealing equilibria
and the parameter values for which they exist. Remember that we still make the
assumption that  +D < 1
2
.
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Theorem 6.2 Let x^L, x^H be any pair of policy announcements satisfying the sym-
metry condition. Then the following statements hold.
1. Suppose jx^L   xmL j < . Then:
(a) If xmL  x^L  xmH then x^L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and
only if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
 + (x^H   x^L) ;
(b) If x^L < xmL then x^
L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and only if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (xmL   x^L)
 +D
;
(c) If x^L > xmH then x^
L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and only if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
  D :
2. Suppose jx^L xmL j  . Then x^L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and
only if x^L   x^H =  and   D (this is independent of the value of ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
An immediate consequence of the theorem above is that a symmetric non-
revealing equilibrium always exists. If D <  then it follows from statement 1.(a)
that there exists an equilibrium with x^L = xmH and x^
H = xmL for   1. If   D
then it follows from statement 2. that, independent of the value of , there exists
an equilibrium with x^L   x^H = .
The abundance of non-revealing equilibria (even with the symmetry restriction)
makes it natural to ask if some of them can be eliminated by a suitable renement
condition. In signalling games the most commonly used renement condition is
the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)). For non-revealing equilibria in our
model the Intuitive Criterion puts the following restrictions on out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. Consider a non-revealing equilibrium x^L, x^H , ^L and a deviation by Candi-
date L to some x. Suppose we are allowed to change the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
and that by doing so we can make the deviation protable if and only if the state
is L (H). Then we must have
^L(x; x^
H ; l) = ^L(x; x^
H ; h) = 1
(^L(x; x^
H ; l) = ^L(x; x^
H ; h) = 0):
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Analogous restrictions are put on the belief function in out-of-equilibrium situa-
tions where Candidate H deviates.
Unfortunately, as we will now show, the Intuitive Criterion does not eliminate
any of the symmetric non-revealing equilibria of our model.
Theorem 6.3 All symmetric non-revealing equilibria satisfy the Intuitive Crite-
rion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
One way to eliminate many of the symmetric non-revealing equilibria is to
introduce a monotonicity condition on the voter belief function. The content of
the condition is that if one candidate moves to a position that is closer to xmL
(xmH ) but not closer to x

mH
(xmL) then L (1  L) does not decrease.
Denition 6.4 (Monotonicity Condition (M1)) A voter belief function L
satises condition (M1) if the following condition holds. Suppose
jx  xmL j  jy   xmL j and jx  xmH j  jy   xmH j:
Then, for all z 2 X, !V 2 fl; hg,
L(x; z; !
V )  L(y; z; !V ) and L(z; x; !V )  L(z; y; !V ):
There is no directly state-dependent cost for the candidates that can justify
this condition (because they are purely o¢ ce-motivated). Nevertheless it does
seem appealing for voters to think that if one candidate moves closer to e.g. xmL
and not closer to xmH then state L is not less likely to be true.
It is worth noting that only considering equilibria that satisfy (M1) (i.e. the
voter belief function satises (M1)) does not change our result on existence of
revealing equilibria. More precisely the conclusion from Theorem 5.3 still holds
if we require revealing equilibria to satisfy (R1) and (M1). This is easily seen by
checking that the equilibrium belief function used in the proof satises (M1).
In the following result we nd the candidate announcements that are possible
in symmetric non-revealing equilibria satisfying (M1).
Theorem 6.5 The candidate announcements in any symmetric non-revealing equi-
librium satisfying (M1) must satisfy
x^L  xmL and xmH  x^H :
13
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easily checked that for x^L, x^H satisfying x^L  xmL and xmH  x^H the
beliefs used in the proof of Theorem 6.2 satisfy (M1). Therefore we can directly
use this theorem to nd out when the di¤erent symmetric non-revealing equilibria
satisfying (M1) exist. The following corollary sums up the most important results.
Corollary 6.6 There exists a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium satisfying (M1)
if and only if
  N ;
where
N =
1
2
+
1
2
r

 +D
:
Furthermore, for any   N there exists a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium
satisfying (M1) with
x^L = xmL and x^
H = xmH :
From Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 6.6 it follows that for all parameter values
either a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) or a symmetric non-revealing equi-
librium satisfying (M1) exists. We also see that for some parameter values both
types of equilibria exist.
Corollary 6.7 For all ;D;  > 0 with  +D < 1
2
we have that
R =
1
2
+

2( +D)
<
1
2
+
1
2
r

 +D
= N :
So for all parameter values there exists either a revealing equilibrium satisfying
(R1) or a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium satisfying (M1). Furthermore, both
types of equilibria exist for all s in an interval of non-zero length.
Finally note that N is equal to the cut-o¤ value for existence of revealing
equilibria satisfying (R1) and the extra condition from Remark 5.4. So with that
extra condition on revealing equilibria we still have the existence result from the
corollary, but we only have co-existence of the two types of equilibria when  = N .
7 Discussion
We have analyzed how electoral competition works under the following conditions:
 Candidates are better informed than voters, but voters have some private
information;
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 Candidates are purely o¢ ce-motivated;
 Candidate quality is state-dependent.
Our most important insight was that if the electorate is su¢ ciently well in-
formed then there exists a revealing equilibrium and the policy outcome of such
an equilibrium is the median position in the true state of the world. If the elec-
torate is not su¢ ciently well informed then only non-revealing equilibria exist and
in any such equilibrium there is a possibility that the policy outcome is not the
median position in the true state. Thus our analysis emphasizes the importance of
voters being well informed. It is important to note that voters do not need to be
fully informed for electoral competition to function as if they were fully informed.
The result that candidates will reveal the true state only if the electorate is suf-
ciently well informed could be called "The Matthew Principle of Information":
Those who already have good information shall know the truth, but those who do
not shall be lied to1.
Another interesting feature of our model is that policy divergence is possible
in (non-revealing) equilibrium. Thus we see that candidates being better informed
than voters and state-dependent candidate quality can lead to policy divergence
even when candidates are purely o¢ ce-motivated. As far as we know this is a new
potential explanation of policy divergence in electoral competition (see e.g. section
III in the review paper by Osborne (1995) for other explanations).
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9 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5.3.
First we show that   R ) existence.
Consider a belief function ^L satisfying
^L(x

mL
; x; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= xmH ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x

mH
; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= xmL ; !V = l; h;
^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) = 1; L(x

mL
; xmH ; h) = 0;
^L(x

mH
; x; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= xmL ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x

mL
; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= xmH ; !V = l; h;
^L(x

mH
; xmL ; l) = 1; L(x

mH
; xmL ; h) = 0:
We claim that such a belief function together with the candidate strategies
(x^L(L); x^L(H)) = (x^H(L); x^H(H)) = (xmL ; x

mH
)
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satises the equilibrium conditions and (R1). First note that the belief function
satises Bayesrule on the equilibrium path and (R1). Thus we just have to check
the optimality of each candidates strategy. First consider the strategies in state
L. Using (R1) it follows that none of the candidates can gain by deviating to a
x 6= xmH . Thus we just have to check that neither candidate can protably deviate
to xmH .
In equilibrium Candidate L wins with probability 1
2
+  and Candidate H
wins with probability 1
2
  . If Candidate L deviates to xmH then his probability
of winning is
(
1
2
+ (  D)) + (1  )( 1
2
  (  D)) = 1
2
+ (2   1)(  D) < 1
2
+ :
So that is never a protable deviation. If Candidate H deviates to xmH then his
probability of winning is
(
1
2
  ( +D)) + (1  )( 1
2
+ ( +D)) =
1
2
  (2   1)( +D):
Thus the deviation is not protable if
1
2
  (2   1)( +D)  1
2
  :
This inequality is equivalent to
  R:
By symmetry it follows that if no candidate can gain from any deviation in
state L, then that is also the case in state H. Thus the equilibrium conditions are
satised if   R.
Finally we show that existence )   R.
Suppose there exists a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1). We know from
Theorem 5.2 that the candidate strategies must be
(x^L(L); x^L(H)) = (x^H(L); x^H(H)) = (xmL ; x

mH
):
Two necessary conditions for equilibrium are that Candidate H cannot gain by
deviating to xmH in state L and that Candidate L cannot gain by deviating to
xmL in state H. Let ^L be the equilibrium belief and dene
^lL = ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) and ^
h
L = ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; h):
Then the necessary conditions can be written
(
1
2
+ ^lL( +D)  (1  ^lL)( +D))
+ (1  )( 1
2
+ ^hL( +D)  (1  ^hL)( +D)) 
1
2
  
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and
(
1
2
+ (1  ^hL)( +D)  ^hL( +D))
+ (1  )( 1
2
+ (1  ^lL)( +D)  ^lL( +D)) 
1
2
  :
Thus it su¢ ces to show that if both the two inequalities above are satised then
we have   R. By adding the two inequalities and a bit of algebra we get
(^lL   ^hL)(2   1)( +D)  :
Thus we see that ^lL > ^
h
L and then it follows that
(2   1)( +D)  
(^lL   ^hL)
 :
Rearranging this inequality we get   R.2
Proof of Theorem 6.2.
1.(a). First we show that   1
2
+ 1
2
q
 (x^L xmL )
+(x^H x^L) ) existence.
Consider a belief function ^L satisfying
^L(x^
L; x^H ; l) =  and ^L(x^
L; x^H ; h) = 1  ;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= x^L; !V = l; h:
We will show that this belief function supports x^L, x^H as an equilibrium. By
symmetry it su¢ ces to show that CandidateH does not have a protable deviation.
It is easily seen that this is the case if deviating to xmL in state L is not protable.
In state L Candidate Hs equilibrium probability of winning is
1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
By deviating to xmL in state L Candidate H wins with probability
1
2
  (   (x^L   xmL)):
Thus the deviation is not protable if
1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L))  1
2
  (   (x^L   xmL)):
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This inequality is satised if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
 + (x^H   x^L) :
Then we show that existence )   1
2
+ 1
2
q
 (x^L xmL )
+(x^H x^L) .
Let ^L be the equilibrium belief function. Dene
^lL = ^L(x^
L; xmL ; l) and ^
h
L = ^L(x^
L; xmL ; h):
If Candidate H deviates to xmL in state L he wins with probability
1
2
+ (1  2^lL)(   (x^L   xmL)) + (1  )(1  2^hL)(   (x^L   xmL)):
No candidate can protably deviate so we must have
1
2
+ (1  2^lL)(   (x^L   xmL)) + (1  )(1  2^hL)(   (x^L   xmL))
 1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
Since the left hand side is decreasing in ^lLand ^
h
L the inequality still holds if we
replace these numbers by 1s, i.e.
1
2
+ (   (x^L   xmL)) 
1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
From this inequality we easily get
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
 + (x^H   x^L) :
1.(b). The proof is analogous to the proof of 1.(a).
1.(c). The proof is analogous to the proof of 1.(a).
2. First we show that if x^L   x^H =  and   D then x^L, x^H are equilibrium
announcements. Consider a voter belief function ^L satisfying
^L(x^
L; x^H ; l) =  and ^L(x^
L; x^H ; h) = 1  ;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 0 for all x < x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1 for all x > x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 for all x < x^L; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 1 for all x > x^L; !V = l; h:
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Obviously Bayesrule is satised on the equilibrium path. Thus we just have to
show that no candidate can protably deviate. In equilibrium each candidate wins
with probability 1
2
in each state. It is easily seen that if a candidate deviates in
some state then he wins with a probability that is strictly smaller that 1
2
. There-
fore we have an equilibrium.
Finally we show that if x^L  x^H 6=  or  > D then x^L, x^H are not equilibrium
announcements.
First suppose that  > D. If x^L, x^H are equilibrium announcements then
in state L Candidate H wins with a probability strictly less than 1
2
(remember
that jx^L   xmL j  ). But no matter what voters out-of-equilibrium belief are
Candidate H can win with a probability of at least 1
2
by deviating to xmL . Thus
x^L, x^H are not equilibrium announcements.
Then suppose that x^L   x^H 6=  and   D, but for now disregard the special
case x^L   x^H >  and  = D which is handled later. If x^L, x^H are equilibrium
announcements then we have that in each state one of the candidates wins with
probability strictly greater than 1
2
. Consider the state where Candidate L wins
with probability greater than 1
2
. It is straightforward to check that if Candidate
H deviates to the position x given by
x^L   x =  if x^L > xmL ;
x = xmL if x^
L < xmL
then he wins with a probability of at least 1
2
no matter what the votersout-of-
equilibrium beliefs are. Thus x^L, x^H are not equilibrium announcements.
Finally consider the special case x^L  x^H >  and  = D. Each candidate wins
with probability 1
2
in each state. But, in each state, by deviating to xmL Candidate
H can win with a probability stricly greater than 1
2
no matter what the voters
out-of-equilibrium beliefs are. Thus x^L, x^H are not equilibrium announcements.
2
Proof of Theorem 6.3.
Let x^L, x^H , ^L be a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium. Consider a deviation
by Candidate L to a position x. If we want to change the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
such that the probability of winning for Candidate L after the deviation is maximal
then we should choose 0L such that
0L(x; x^
H ; l) = 0L(x; x^
H ; h) = 1
or
0L(x; x^
H ; l) = 0L(x; x^
H ; h) = 0:
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Which of these equations that should be satised depends on x^H and x but not on
the state. Hence we see that Candidate Ls maximal probability of winning after
the deviation is independent of the state. In equilibrium Candidate L wins with
a probability p  1
2
if the state is L and 1   p if the state is H. So if x can (by
changes in the belief function) be made a protable deviation for Candidate L in
state L then the same is true in state H. Similarly we get that if x can be made a
protable deviation for Candidate H in state H then the same is true in state L.
Therefore the Intuitive Criterion does not eliminate the equilibrium if
^L(x; x^
H ; l) = ^L(x; x^
H ; h) = 0 for all x 6= x^L
and
^L(x^
L; x; l) = ^L(x^
L; x; h) = 1 for all x 6= x^H :
All equilibrium announcements in part 1. of Theorem 6.2 are supported by such
beliefs (see the proof). That is not true for the equilibrium announcements in part
2. of the theorem. But for those equilibrium announcements each candidate wins
with probability 1
2
in both states. Therefore the Intuitive Criterion does not put
any restrictions at all on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.5.
Suppose x^L, x^H , ^L is a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium satisfying (M1)
with x^L > xmL . We split the proof into two cases, x^
L  xmH and x^L > xmH .
If x^L  xmH then in state L Candidate L wins with probability
1
2
+ (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
If Candidate L deviates to xmL then, by using that ^L satises (M1), we get that
he wins with a probability of at least
1
2
+ (2   1)2( + (x^H   xmL)):
Since x^L > xmL we have x^
H   xmL > x^H   x^L and thus the deviation is protable.
That is a contradiction.
If x^L > xmH then in state L Candidate L wins with probability
1
2
+ (2   1)2(  D):
Suppose Candidate L deviates to the position x satisfying xmH   x = x^L   xmH .
Then Candidate L has moved closer to xmL and not closer to x

mH
. And then it fol-
lows by (M1) that his probability of winning has increased. That is a contradiction.
2
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